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Abstract
This article provides a critical analysis of the public opinion on 
peace in Sri Lanka, with consideration to two determinants: social 
differentiation and politicisation of identities. Specifically, it aims at 
developing arguments about the correlations between public opinion, 
social position, and political mobilisation. Inspired by Bourdieu’s 
concepts of habitus, social space, and political field, this article 
develops an empirical analysis of the links between ethnic identity 
and public opinion on peace, and between social differentiation and 
opinions within the Sinhalese majority community in Sri Lanka. This 
article argues that ethnic polarisation and politicisation were the 
foremost determinants of public opinion during the peace process in 
2002-2009.
Introduction
How did the public opinion on peace in Sri Lanka vary between 
different social groups and with changing political dynamics during 
the peace process of 2002-2009? And what explains these variations 
and changes? Do they reflect class structures in society or are they 
the outcome of politicisation of ethnic identities? The purpose of 
this article is to examine the public opinion on peace with regard to 
two general determinants: social differentiation and politicisation 
of identities. Empirically, we will use survey data to develop an 
argument about the links between public opinion, social position, 
and political mobilisation. 
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The article is organised in three sections. The first section 
outlines the conceptual framework for the analysis, drawing 
especially on Bourdieu’s notions of habitus, social space, and 
political field. Following from this theoretical discussion, the next 
section provides a brief analysis of postcolonial social cleavages 
and politicisation of class interests and ethnic identities. This is 
followed by empirical analyses of the links between ethnic identity 
and public opinion on peace, and between social differentiation – 
in terms of occupation and education – and opinions within the 
Sinhalese majority community. We conclude that ethnic polarisation 
and politicisation appears to be the foremost determinant of public 
opinion on peace from 2002-2009.
Social space, political field and political position
 The existing literature on political opinions and allegiances 
in Sri Lanka revolve around campaigns and voting patterns in 
parliamentary, presidential, and local elections. Sri Lanka has 
enjoyed universal suffrage since 1931, more than 60 years of 
liberal democracy, and has been marked by regime changes 
mostly through free and fair elections since independence in 1948. 
Electoral campaigning is normally intense and voter turnout tends 
to be relatively high, especially in national elections. 
The existing literature on voter allegiance in Sri Lanka is 
marked by a divide between structure/society-orientated and 
actor/polity-orientated approaches. Structure/society-orientated 
approaches, on the one hand, emphasise how the composition 
of the electorate determines voter behaviour and election results. 
These studies reflect the international literature that argues 
that social cleavages divide people into voting blocs and parties 
construct their identities and policies to position themselves 
with regard to class, region, religion, gender, ethnicity, and other 
cleavages. In Sri Lanka, it is common to emphasise cleavages based 
on the urban/rural divide, social class, caste, ethnic identities, 
language, and religion as structural explanations for the character 
of political parties and voting patterns. There are, on the one hand, 
studies that emphasise the centrality of ethnic relations in post-
colonial politics, in agreement with the logic of Horowitz (1985). 
Marxian scholars, on the other hand, have emphasised class 
relations (see, for example, Gunasinghe, 1984, and Jayawardena, 
2003), while Jiggins (1979) has argued that caste cleavages are key 
determinants of party allegiances in Sri Lanka. According to this 
structural/functional mode of analysis, political parties are seen as 
reflections of structural cleavages in society. The United National 
Party (UNP) is commonly presented as a capitalist, pro-west, anti-
Buddhist party that has received wide support from landlords and 
urban and rural business interests. The Sri Lanka Freedom Party 
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(SLFP) is often portrayed as a nationalist and socialist party that 
gains support from Sinhala-Buddhists and, in particular, from the 
intermediate classes within the Sinhalese majority. Leftist parties, 
such as the Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP), Communist Party 
(CP), and the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), have their social 
base in the working and lower-middle classes. Parties such as the 
All Ceylon Tamil Congress (ACTC), Federal Party (FP), Tamil United 
Liberation Front (TULF), Tamil National Alliance (TNA), and the Sri 
Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC), reflect ethnic minority interests.
Actor- and polity-orientated approaches, on the other 
hand, emphasise the political practices of parties and politicians 
in constructing electorates and mobilising voters. There are, for 
example, a number of studies that see ethnic polarisation and 
conflict in Sri Lanka as products of post-colonial politics rather 
than reflections of primordial ethnic cleavages. Along this line of 
inquiry, De Votta (2004) argues that the key mechanisms behind 
post-colonial Sinhalese and Tamil nationalism are to be found 
in the way liberal democratic institutions and elite rivalry have 
fostered Sinhalese and Tamil ethnonationalism, resulting in ethnic 
majoritarianism, minority resistance, and decaying democratic 
institutions. Focusing more on local political dynamics, Jayanntha 
(1992) identifies political clientelism as a determining factor in party 
allegiance and argues that elections are not fought on the ground 
of party-ideologies and structural cleavages but are instead driven 
by patrons mobilising their different local networks. Jayanntha’s 
analysis resonates well with the international literature on the role 
of political clientelism for voter behaviour and party allegiances in 
many states in the global South (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2005). 
The general argument here is that symbolic construction and 
clientelist representation of social groups are key determinants for 
political opinions and voter allegiances. 
Habitus and social space
 While existing studies of electoral allegiances have tended 
to emphasise either structural cleavages in society or political 
dynamics in competitive party systems, Chandra (2004) observes 
that these are complementary rather than mutually exclusive 
approaches. Social divisions have an undeniable structuring 
effect on political identities and interests, but the construction 
and mobilisation of collectivities are also contingent on political 
agency. What is needed is a conceptual framework that can bridge 
the divide between structure/society- and agency/polity-orientated 
approaches. One useful source of inspiration for such a combined 
approach may be found in the theory of practice developed by 
Bourdieu. The following paragraphs will highlight elements of his 
work that are relevant for our analysis.
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Bourdieu (1990,1998) argues that social practice, including 
political position taking, can neither be understood as a simple 
question of individual rationality nor as a direct outcome of social 
structures, but suggests the notion of habitus as a mediating link 
between social structures (relations of capital) and practices in a field. 
Habitus is a system of internalised social norms, understandings, 
and patterns of behaviour that make it natural to understand the 
social world and act in certain ways. Social practices are thus 
formed by the actors’ habitus, but also the capital they possess 
and the field within which they operate. This can be schematically 
summarised by the equation: Practice = (habitus * capital) + field 
(Figure 1).
Figure 1. Key concepts in Bourdieu’s theory of practice.
Thompson (1991) points out that the dispositions of the 
habitus are acquired, structured, durable, and transposable. First, 
they are not given but acquired, particularly through childhood 
socialisation, and are constituted through un-reflexive and mundane 
processes of habit formation. Second, dispositions are structured 
by the social conditions in which they are acquired. This means 
that individuals from a middle-class background hold dispositions 
that differ from those produced in a working-class environment. 
This also means that habitus may be relatively homogenous 
among individuals from similar backgrounds. Third, dispositions 
are durable in the sense that they are embodied and operate at 
the sub-conscious level and are, thus, not easily available for self-
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reflection and modification. Fourth, dispositions are generative 
and transposable, meaning that they can generate perceptions and 
practices also in other fields than those where they were acquired. 
These observations imply that the habitus is both the product of 
social conditions and the producer of strategies acting upon those 
conditions. It is a structuring structure that yields habitual practices 
without the actors necessarily reflecting on what they are doing. 
But the habitus is also a structured structure because the embodied 
dispositions are rooted in social conditions and generated through 
contextual habituation. It is this dual character of habitus – as a 
producer of habits and a product of habituation – that makes it 
a mediating link between social structures and practice (Grenfell, 
2008). 
Figure 2. General forms of capital with possible conversions.
The understanding of habitus as a structured structure 
brings up the question of social differentiation. Bourdieu’s (1986) 
entry point to social stratification and power is his concept of capital 
(Figure 2). Individuals and groups are positioned in social space 
according to their possession of capital, presenting itself in three 
fundamental forms: (1) economic capital (material wealth in the form 
of property, money, etc.); (2) social capital (social resources in the 
form of networks and contacts based on mutual recognition); (3) 
cultural capital (informational assets in the form of knowledge and 
skills acquired through socialisation and education, etc.). Bourdieu 
observes that one form of capital can be converted into another. 
This convertibility of capital means, for instance, that educational 
qualifications (cultural capital) or social networks (social capital) 
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can be converted into an attractive job (economic capital). Most 
importantly, social, economic, and cultural capital can be converted 
into symbolic capital, meaning that possession of economic, social, 
or cultural capital is the basis for legitimate authority in a field 
(Bourdieu, 1990). 
This conceptualisation of capital is important for the 
understanding of social differentiation. Bourdieu (1984, 1987) 
argues that people are stratified according to the volume and 
composition of the capital they possess (Figure 3). The field of power 
(i.e. the elite) is made up of those who control large volumes of 
capital, but the elite is divided by the composition of capital. Thus, 
the field of power does not imply a unified elite but, rather, diverse 
elite groups that hold different forms of capital and struggle to gain 
symbolic recognition for their particular kind of capital. Based 
on this mapping of social space, Bourdieu argues that there is a 
homology between social positions and dispositions (habitus). This 
means that the social space is reflected in values and preferences, 
including political opinions. 
Figure 3. Social space and orientations towards left and right 
politics (after Bourdieu 1998).
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The political field and symbolic representation
Habitus and practices are structured by people’s positions 
in social space, but they are also shaped by the context for 
practice. Bourdieu contextualises practice through the notion of 
fields, i.e. social systems that are characterised by a competition 
for accumulation of field-specific forms of symbolic capital. The 
defining feature of the field is the form of symbolic capital that is 
at stake. The political field is, for instance, defined by the struggle 
for accumulation of political capital, meaning that political 
professionals strive to gain recognition as a legitimate authority 
with the right to represent non-professions (‘the people’):
The political field is thus the site of a competition … for 
the monopoly of the right to speak and act in the name 
of some or all of the non-professionals. The spokesperson 
appropriates not only the words of the group of 
nonprofessionals, that is, most of the time, its silence, 
but also the very power of that group, which he helps to 
produce by lending it a voice recognized as legitimate in 
the political field (Bourdieu 1991: 190).
Positions as political professionals may be based on the 
personal capital of the spokesperson – for example, factors such 
as fame and popularity. However, it can also be ‘objectified 
political capital’ (recognition and loyalties) that reside in state 
institutions and political parties and are granted to political 
professionals. Transfer of political capital between the party and 
the professional follows the logic of investment in the sense that 
political professionals, on the one hand, may invest in a party to 
gain access to its institutionalised political capital. Political parties, 
on the other hand, may invest in political professionals to reap 
benefits from their personal capital. Based on observations of 
French politics at the time of his writing, Bourdieu (1991) argues 
that the professional depends as much on the party as the electoral 
constituency for accumulation of political capital. The ‘possession’ 
of an electoral constituency depends on the representative’s position 
within a party and breaking away from the party normally means 
losing the basis for legitimate political authority. This may not hold 
true, however, for political systems characterised by personalistic 
and clientelist politics. In such situations, the balance between 
institutionalised and personal political capital shifts in favour of 
the latter. The politician’s symbolic capital – derived from his/her 
economic, social, and cultural capital – combined with the capacity 
to access state resources is what grants political capital. Hence, 
under Sri Lanka’s clientelist political system and elections based 
on proportional representation and multiple voter preferences, a 
politician can break away from the party and still retain his seat, 
thereby exploiting new bases (Peiris, 2010).
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To gain legitimacy as a political spokesperson, competing 
political actors (parties and politicians) engage in symbolic struggles 
to impose and normalise representations of the world that suit their 
own interests. The power of the ideas proposed by these political 
actors is measured by their ability to produce and mobilise a group 
of people, meaning that they must resonate with the habitus of 
those they intend to mobilise. Bourdieu (1991) argues that this 
symbolic relationship between political representatives and those 
that are being represented is structured by the competitive relations 
between political professionals. Therefore, political representation 
is determined both by the relationship between representatives and 
represented, and between competing representatives (Stokke and 
Selboe, 2009). The relevance of this for our analysis is that political 
construction and politicisation of issues and identities, stemming 
from the struggle for accumulation of political capital, constitute 
a source of public opinion. Thus, we have two different but 
interrelated logics that might frame public opinion: one stemming 
from structural cleavages in society and the other originating from 
strategies and relations in the political field. This general framework 
will guide our empirical analysis of public opinion on peace in Sri 
Lanka.
Post-colonial cleavages and political mobilisation
Post-colonial Sri Lankan politics has been characterised 
by complexity and political fragmentation, originating both in 
multi-dimensional cleavages in society and from divisions and 
competition within the political elite. It can be observed that class 
and ethnicity have played a pivotal role in post-colonial politics, but 
this is compounded by identities and allegiances based on religion, 
language, caste, region, gender, and family. It can also be noted 
that there has been a shift in the relative importance of class and 
ethnicity. While there was a clear primacy of class politics in the 
early post-colonial period, this has been overtaken by a growing 
politicisation and polarisation of ethnic identities. 
Sri Lankan politics at the time of independence was marked 
by colonial class cleavages and politicisation of class interests 
rather than ethnic identities. Colonialism had produced a multi-
ethnic dominant class that was subordinated to British capital but 
also far removed from the domestic popular classes (Jayawardena, 
2003). The political project that was pursued by this multi-ethnic 
elite was essentially a continuation of the colonial accumulation 
regime and elite domination (Uyangoda, 1992). Colonialism had also 
institutionalised ethnicity as an administrative category and linked 
communal identities to political representation, but communal 
tensions were largely confined to debates about constitutional 
arrangements and were overshadowed by elite collaboration across 
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ethnic divides (Wickramasinghe, 2006). The multi-ethnic dominant 
class was challenged by leftist parties and trade unions led by 
western-educated radical intellectuals, politicising the interests of 
the working class and advocating social revolution (Jayawardena, 
1985). Thus, early post-colonial mass politics was characterised 
by elite-led party politicisation of class interests, with ideological 
polarisation between the rightist United National Party (UNP) and 
All Ceylon Tamil Congress (ACTC), on the one hand, and the leftist 
Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP) and Communist Party (CP), on 
the other. This situation is presented as a Bourdieu-inspired map 
of the political field in Figure 4.
Figure 4. Party politicisation of class (from late 1940s to mid 
1950s).
The class politics of the early post-colonial period was also 
characterised by political under-representation, despite numerical 
dominance of intermediate classes, including peasants, small 
traders, public sector employees, and monks. These intermediate 
classes became the subject of ethnonationalist political 
incorporation from the 1950s, propelled by political competition 
within the elite as much as by class cleavages in society. A 
breakaway section from the UNP formed the Sri Lanka Freedom 
Party (SLFP) and pursued mobilisation of intermediate classes 
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through a combination of religious, linguistic, and livelihood issues 
among the Sinhalese Buddhist majority, placing themselves in an 
antagonistic relationship to both the anglicised elite within the UNP 
and the class politics of the leftist parties (Figure 5). This strategy of 
merging intermediate class interests and ethnic identity delivered 
a landslide electoral victory for SLFP in the 1956 elections and has 
been a hegemonic electoral strategy for all Sinhalese parties since 
then (De Votta, 2004; Manor, 1989).
The elitist political incorporation within the Sinhalese majority 
was paralleled by similar developments within Tamil minority 
politics. A section broke away from the ACTC and formed the Federal 
Party (FP) in the 1950s, mobilising popular support for a non-
violent campaign for Tamil self-determination within a federal state 
(Wilson, 1988). Thus, the early post-colonial period was marked by 
the rise of two parallel ethnonationalist political projects, emerging 
from colonial identity constructions and formulated in opposition 
to conservative- and radical-class politics as much as the ethno-
national ‘other’. This shift from class to ethnic politics prepared the 
ground for Sinhalese majoritarianism, Tamil minority resistance 
and the escalation of ethnic conflict in subsequent decades, but 
there were also important tendencies towards social and political 
inclusion. While electoral competition between SLFP and UNP gave 
leftist and minority parties leverage in political negotiations and 
government coalitions, state-led development and universal welfare 
programmes supported social development and mobility, especially 
for the intermediate classes (Moore, 1989; Shastri, 1983). This 
situation is depicted in Figure 5.
Whereas the late 1950s and the 1960s witnessed the 
growth of Sinhalese and Tamil ethnonationalist mobilisation 
in combination with state-led development and welfarism, the 
1970s were marked by development crises, social exclusion, and 
ethnic polarisation. Economic stagnation and voter frustration 
with unfulfilled campaign promises produced a landslide 
electoral victory for a SLFP-left coalition government in 1970, but 
widespread unemployment and soaring costs of living undermined 
the legitimacy of the government and led to an insurgency by the 
Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), mobilising marginalised youth 
from the Sinhalese intermediate classes (Obeyesekere, 1984). In this 
situation, the government responded with a combination of state 
socialism, ethnonationalist populism, clientelist concessions to key 
constituencies, and authoritarian repression of JVP, Tamil-elite 
parties, and emerging militant groups. The strong majority held by 
the government undermined the political leverage of the minorities, 
thereby marginalising the Tamil political elite and weakening their 
legitimacy vis-a-vis radicalised youth groups (Figure 6). In turn, 
the Tamil political elite joined forces in the Tamil United Liberation 
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Front and radicalised its demands from federalism to a separate 
Tamil state. TULF advocated non-violent and democratic means, 
but this was overtaken by the growth of separatist militancy in the 
face of state repression and anti-Tamil riots in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s (Hellmann-Rajanayagam, 1994; Swamy, 1994).
Figure 5. Ethnonationalist political incorporation of intermediate 
classes (1950s and 1960s).
The Tamil and Sinhalese militant movements that emerged 
in the 1970s both relied on ethnonationalism to contest and 
lay claim on political authority. The socialist-ethnonationalist 
strategy that had been developed for the purpose of elitist political 
incorporation of intermediate classes in the 1950s and 1960s was, 
therefore, appropriated and radicalised by non-elite forces in the 
context of social and political exclusion. Hence, ethnic polarisation 
and emerging militancy from below were key characteristics of Sri 
Lankan politics in the 1970s and the early 1980s. This situation is 
visualised in Figure 6.
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Figure 6. Ethnonationalist polarisation and emerging militancy 
(1970s and early 1980s).
Following the growing ethnic polarisation and militancy in 
the 1970s, the period from the early 1980s to 2009 was marked 
by the escalation of ethnic polarisation into armed conflict. In 
the context of political centralisation, marginalisation of minority 
representatives, authoritarian rule and anti-Tamil riots, Tamil 
nationalism was transformed from TULF’s democratic campaign for 
a separate state to the hegemony of militant separatism (Figure 7).
From the anti-Tamil riots in 1983 to the military defeat of 
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in 2009, Sri Lanka 
was marked by an armed conflict between the Government of 
Sri Lanka (GOSL) and militant Tamil separatism (Balasingham, 
2004; Swamy, 1994). The Tamil separatist movement consisted 
initially of several militant groups, but organisational, ideological, 
and personal animosities produced armed clashes within and 
between the different organisations. The LTTE emerged as the 
dominant militant organisation in the late 1980s, annihilating or 
subordinating the other groups. Some of the non-LTTE groups 
entered into collaboration with the GOSL, exchanging intelligence 
and paramilitary operations with protection, material rewards, 
and political power. This situation is schematically represented in 
Figure 7.
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Figure 7. Ethnonationalist conflict and political clientelism     
(mid 1980s to 2005).
Figure 8. Personalistic politics with ethnonationalist populism and 
clientelism (since 2005).
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The period since the change of government in 2004 and the 
victory of Mahinda Rajapakse in the presidential election in 2005 
has been marked by both continuity and change with regard to the 
previous periods of post-colonial politics (Figure 8). It can be observed 
that the political centralisation that was constitutionalised in 
1978, with the president as the pivotal political authority, has been 
furthered in a highly personalistic way. After becoming president, 
Mahinda Rajapakse has built a political dynasty around a closely 
knit network of family, kinship relations and political professionals 
with personal loyalty to himself. This personalistic political 
network has, to a large extent, replaced the pre-existing SLFP party 
structure, while political networks and loyalties also cross party 
political divides, especially between the two main parties SLFP and 
UNP. The final stage of the war as well as the post-war period has 
also been marked by militarisation and state coercion against the 
Tamil insurgency, critical journalists, civil society organisations, 
and the political opposition. While political clients enjoy patronage 
in the form of positions of power and material benefits, political 
parties and individuals that are opposed to the ruling network have 
been targeted for repressive measures. 
The present period is marked by Sinhalese majoritarianism 
with marginalisation of minority political parties and questions of 
group rights and devolution of power. Political representatives and 
parties from the ethnic minorities face the dilemma between entering 
into patronage politics, that is experienced as an unproductive co-
optation, or to remain politically ineffective in the opposition and 
become potential targets of state repression. Whereas the Tamil 
National Alliance (TNA), a political alliance that emerged from 
the old Tamil parties and was close to LTTE during the ceasefire 
agreement period, has chosen a position in the political opposition, 
former militant groups such as Eelam People’s Democratic Party 
(EPDP) and Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP) have entered 
into clientelist networks and have gained positions in national 
politics and at the province level in the north and east. Within the 
Sinhalese polity, the ethnonationalist Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) 
has remained loyal to the ruling government while the JVP has 
broken out of the government coalition. 
In this situation, benefits and opportunities from the 
political field for both elite and non-elite actors are increasingly 
dependent on skilful handling of political networks and allegiances. 
Popular mobilisation and political loyalties rely increasingly on 
ethnonationalist populism and personalistic clientelism, while non-
ethnicised political programmes play a marginal role for political 
mobilisation and opinions. This situation is tentatively outlined in 
Figure 8.
51
PCD Journal Vol. II, No. 1 2010
The Sri Lankan peace process
The 26 years of warfare in Sri Lanka was interspersed by 
attempts at negotiated conflict resolution in 1985 (the Thimpu Talks), 
in 1987 (the Indo-Lanka Accord), in 1989-1990 (the Premadassa-
LTTE talks), in 1994-1995 (the Kumaratunga-LTTE talks) and in 
2001-2002 (the Wickremasinghe-LTTE talks) (Balasingham, 2004; 
Gooneratne, 2007; Rupesinghe, 2006; Stokke and Uyangoda, 2011; 
Uyangoda and Perera, 2003). None of these managed to resolve the 
conflict, but the 2002-2003 talks produced a ceasefire agreement 
that formally existed until January, 2009. Thereafter, the conflict 
ended through a final war and military defeat of the LTTE in May 
2009. Before turning to our empirical analysis, we will provide a 
brief review of the peace process and its different stages in order 
to make sense of the changing public opinion on peace during the 
ceasefire period.
The design and dynamics of the peace process were first and 
foremost shaped by: (1) a military-territorial balance of power that 
brought GOSL and LTTE to negotiations and kept them from resuming 
warfare for several years after the talks stalled; (2) entrenched 
constitutional and political barriers to state reforms for devolution 
of power to minority areas; (3) severe crises of development in terms 
of large-scale humanitarian needs in war-affected areas and slow 
and uneven economic growth throughout the island (Bastian, 2007; 
Liyanage, 2008; Uyangoda and Perera, 2003; Stokke and Uyangoda, 
2011). First, the balance of power between LTTE and GOSL made 
the peace process resemble international conflict resolution 
between incompatible state-building projects, i.e. between GOSL’s 
aim of rebuilding the unitary Sri Lankan state and LTTE’s goal of 
achieving self-determination for Tamils in a separate state. The 
ceasefire agreement froze the military-territorial balance of power, 
segmented a de facto dual-state structure and institutionalised 
a degree of parity between the two parties in the peace process. 
Second, the institutional and political obstacles to power sharing, 
stemming from constitutionalised political centralisation, the weak 
majority of the government, and the practices of ethnic outbidding 
and instrumental opposition to peace within Sinhalese politics, 
gave the process a pragmatic design where immediate security and 
humanitarian concerns were prioritised at the expense of political 
conflict resolution. Third, the crises of development provided a 
point of convergence between the GOSL and LTTE while also being 
the basis for a strong internationalisation of peace through the 
participation of Sri Lanka’s international aid donors (Bastian, 2007). 
Combined with the political/institutional obstacles to substantive 
conflict resolution, this gave the peace process its distinct character 
of pursuing ‘peace through development’ (Shanmugaratnam and 
Stokke, 2008). 
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In terms of the different stages in the peace process, we have 
elsewhere argued that the period from the initiation of the peace 
process to the military defeat of LTTE in 2009 could be divided 
into three distinct periods: (1) active-peace negotiations from 2002-
2004; (2) negative peace from 2004-2006; (3) war for peace from 
2006-2009. This periodisation is also the basis for the empirical 
analysis in the present article.
The active-peace period (2002-2004) followed after the 
government’s invitation to Norway to facilitate peace negotiations 
between the LTTE and the GOSL. The marginal electoral victory 
of the liberal peace and market friendly UNP-led coalition in 2001 
paved the way for Norwegian-facilitated talks with the LTTE. A 
ceasefire agreement was signed in February 2002 between the 
GOSL and the LTTE and was followed by six rounds of talks in 
2002-2003. These were mainly ‘talks on talks’ in the sense that 
they focused primarily on non-core issues as a trust-building basis 
for future talks (Gooneratne, 2007; Liyanage, 2008; Uyangoda and 
Perera, 2003). The signing and implementation of the ceasefire 
agreement was the main achievement and created a relatively 
peaceful situation despite numerous ceasefire violations. The 
ceasefire agreement also provided a space for internationally funded 
humanitarian rehabilitation in war-affected areas. In the absence 
of substantive conflict resolution, development became the prime 
concern and point of convergence between the protagonists to the 
conflict. However, development also became highly contentious as 
the question of power sharing in interim development administration 
for the north-east impinged on future power-sharing arrangements 
the negotiations to a stalemate (Shanmugaratnam and Stokke, 
2008). Simultaneously, the two parties to the negotiations were 
weakened by internal changes in their ethnic constituencies. 
While the government was increasingly challenged by Sinhalese 
nationalist agitation against the government, the peace process, and 
the role of the international actors, (especially Norway), the LTTE 
was weakened by an internal split when their eastern commander 
defected with large numbers of cadres. Finally, the presidential 
take-over of three key ministries in 2004 made it increasingly 
difficult to restart the stalled negotiation process.1 
The negative-peace period (2004-2006) covers the period of 
no war/no peace from the change of government in 2004 to the 
gradual resumption of hostilities from 2006. During this period, 
the ceasefire agreement was formally upheld but the two parties did 
not show interest in pursuing active-peace negotiations. The period 
was instead marked by numerous ceasefire agreement violations 
as well as clashes between the LTTE and the breakaway Karuna 
faction in the Eastern Province. The tsunami disaster in December 
2004 delayed the resumption of warfare, but the parties failed to use 
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the disaster as an opportunity to restart the peace negotiations. An 
attempt to establish a joint mechanism for managing humanitarian 
aid to the disaster affected areas in the north and east failed due to 
legal and political obstacles (Rainford and Satkunanathan, 2011). 
This was considered a victory for Sinhalese nationalism, as was the 
election of Mahinda Rajapakse from SLFP as president in 2006. At 
the same time, there was a gradual shift within the LTTE away from 
political negotiations to militant means, most strikingly manifested 
in the assassination of Sri Lanka’s Foreign Minister in 2005. A 
final attempt to restart the peace process through two meetings in 
Geneva in 2006 failed, thus paving the way for a return to armed 
hostilities. The 2004-2006 period was thus marked by an absence 
of open warfare and a lack of real progress towards lasting peace. 
This is a situation that peace researchers describe as ‘negative 
peace’ (Uyangoda, 2005).
The war-for-peace period, from 2006-2009, was characterised 
by the gradual resumption of warfare – first through covert attack 
by both parties and later through direct military engagement – 
which culminated in full-scale war in 2009 and military defeat of 
the LTTE in May, 2009. As the Sri Lankan armed forces moved into 
LTTE-controlled areas, civilians were displaced in large numbers 
and the violations of human rights increased. These human rights 
violations included extra-judicial killings, extortions, abductions, 
disappearances, and the continuation of the culture of impunity. 
The LTTE, too, intensified their attacks on the security forces, 
but the Sri Lankan armed forces were superior in terms of 
intelligence, military hardware, man power, and domestic and 
international backing. This allowed them to pursue an aggressive, 
coordinated, and non-interrupted military campaign. The LTTE 
was internationally isolated and confronted by an enemy with 
political determination, military capacity, and popular support. 
Thus, the Sri Lankan armed conflict ended through military 
means, allowing the government to dictate the conditions of peace 
for the defeated enemy.
Public opinion on peace during the peace process
How did the public opinion vary and change in the context 
of Sri Lanka’s peace process and what explains these variations 
and changes? The best source for empirical data on this question 
is the Peace Confidence Index (PCI) compiled by Social Indicator, 
the survey research unit of the Centre for Policy Alternatives in 
Colombo.2 Before we begin to explore the empirical data, it is 
necessary to introduce the PCI and how we organised the data for 
this analysis (Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2010a, 2010b).  
The PCI is an island-wide opinion survey designed to capture 
the trends in public opinion related to the peace process that began 
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in the middle of 2001. Initially the PCI was a bi-monthly survey. 
However, it was later changed to a quarterly survey. Each survey 
interviewed approximately 1800 individuals from the Sinhalese, 
Tamil and Muslim communities across the country, except in areas 
in the Northern and Eastern provinces which were controlled by 
the LTTE during the ceasefire agreement period. Therefore, the 
PCI captured the opinions of the entire Sinhalese community 
and the opinions of the Tamil and Muslim communities who lived 
outside the conflict zone.  Following the escalation of violence in 
the Northern and Eastern provinces and the worsening situation 
of human rights violations in the south during the negative-peace 
period, some of the PCI surveys could not cover the opinion of the 
Tamil community. 
For the present analysis, we have selected two surveys – the 
first and third surveys – from each year. Since the analysis was 
done according to the aforementioned three periods – active peace, 
negative peace and war for peace – the data sets of the selected 
surveys in each period were merged together. This meant that the 
total sample size exceeded 4000 interviews for each period, which 
allowed us to perform our analysis with a great deal of reliability. 
Finally, we used the demographic data to construct new education 
and occupation categories to inquire into the relationship between 
the public opinion on peace and social differentiation. 
The questionnaire used for the PCI carried a set of standard 
questions throughout the whole period in order to facilitate 
longitudinal analysis, while current political developments were 
captured through a set of questions that varied from one survey 
to another. We have extracted data regarding three key questions 
about the peace process in Sri Lanka: (1) the preferred mode of 
conflict resolution; (2) the commitment of GOSL and LTTE to 
negotiated peace; (3) the support for the role of the international 
community in the peace process. These will be analysed according 
to the ethnic identities and social stratification of the respondents.
Ethnicisation of the public opinion on peace
The PCI data shows that the public opinion on peace is 
highly influenced by the ethnic identity of each individual. Figures 
9, 10, and 11 summarise the communal opinions for the selected 
questions and show distinct variations and changes over time 
within the three ethnic communities.
The most fundamental question in popular and political 
discourse throughout the Sri Lankan conflict has been about the 
mode of conflict resolution: Should the conflict end by political or 
military means? In the course of the conflict, attempts at negotiating 
peace between the government and the Tamil insurgency were 
interspersed by periods dominated by warfare. The ceasefire period 
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also went from a situation dominated by direct negotiations to a 
phase of negative peace before ending in full-scale warfare. Against 
this background, Figure 9 shows the public opinion with regard to 
three general modes of conflict resolution: peace negotiations (liberal 
peace), military solution (war for peace) or a combination of the 
previous two (a military weakening of the opponent followed by peace 
negotiations). The figure shows a divide in the public opinion between 
the Sinhalese majority and the Tamil and Muslim minorities. The 
PCI indicates that the Sinhalese community supported a negotiated 
settlement nearly as much as their minority counterparts during 
the active-peace period. While almost all Tamils (98.6 per cent) and 
Muslims (97.4 per cent) preferred a negotiated solution, nine out 
of 10 Sinhalese (88.9 per cent) did. However, even at the height of 
the peace process and the pro-peace media campaign by the UNP 
government, 8.3 per cent of the Sinhalese community preferred a 
military solution. As the peace process stalled and was replaced 
by open warfare, support for negotiations decreased and the divide 
between the majority and minority communities increased. While 
a clear majority of Tamils (84.4 per cent) and Muslims (84.8 per 
cent) maintained their support for negotiations during the war-for-
peace period, the support for negotiations among the Sinhalese 
declined to 33 per cent. The largest group of Sinhalese (47.2 per 
cent) preferred a military solution, whereas very few Tamils (3.4 per 
cent) and Muslims (3.6 per cent) viewed this as a desirable option. 
Figure 9. Opinions on mode of conflict resolution according to 
ethnicity.
 
Beyond the basic question of political or military conflict 
resolution, the PCI also showed that there were communally 
divided opinions on the meaning of negotiations, both in terms of 
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who should participate in the negotiations and what kind of power 
sharing arrangements were deemed preferable (Peiris and Stokke, 
2011). The preference among the Sinhalese was for negotiations 
to ensure participation of all stakeholders – from the government, 
the opposition, LTTE, Tamil and Muslim political parties, etc. The 
Tamil community, too, preferred inclusive negotiations, but Tamils 
expressed a stronger support for international facilitation than 
the Sinhalese. The clear Muslim preference was for a process with 
maximum inclusivity of all stakeholders. With the examination of 
data over time, a growing preference for inclusivity could be found 
in all communities, while the support for exclusive negotiations 
between the GOSL and LTTE decreased. This means that there 
existed a widening gap between the public opinion on inclusivity 
and the actual design of the peace process.
Figure 10. Opinions on GOSL and LTTE commitment to negotiated 
peace according to ethnicity.
The 2002-2003 peace negotiations were designed as narrowly 
defined talks between LTTE and GOSL, facilitated by Norway. 
The political opposition, the Muslim minority, non-LTTE Tamil 
actors, civil society organisations, and the Buddhist Sangha were 
all excluded from the peace process, and there was no systematic 
parallel process aimed at building a broader consensus on peace. 
This design reflected the military balance of power between the 
GOSL and LTTE and was also based on the assumption that the two 
parties could negotiate on behalf of their communal constituencies. 
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This narrow negotiation process raised critical questions and 
debate about the commitment and strategies of the two parties. 
Figure 10 shows that the popular opinion on the protagonists’ 
commitment to negotiated peace varied between communities and 
over time. It can be observed that all communities had a fairly high 
level of trust in the government’s commitment to negotiated peace 
during the active-peace period. Interestingly, Tamil (56.7 per cent) 
and Muslim (70.9 per cent) minorities showed a higher trust in the 
government than the Sinhalese (49.0 per cent) majority at the time. 
The Tamil (73.7 per cent) and Muslim (45.6 per cent) minorities 
also showed considerable trust in the LTTE’s commitment. This 
was in sharp contrast to the Sinhalese opinion (15.5 per cent) 
on LTTE’s commitment to negotiated peace. Additional data from 
the PCI survey showed that the prevalent view among Sinhalese 
was that LTTE was engaging in peace talks for tactical reasons, a 
sentiment that was also shared by a number of Muslims (Peiris and 
Stokke, 2011). 
Figure 10 also shows that the strong confidence that 
the Tamil and Muslim minorities had in the GOSL and LTTE’s 
commitment to a negotiated settlement of the conflict eroded in the 
course of the peace process. A more disaggregated analysis shows 
that the confidence of the Sinhalese majority, as well as the Tamil 
and Muslim minorities, declined at the end of the active-peace 
period before temporarily going up again after the 2004 tsunami 
disaster (Peiris and Stokke, 2011). After the change of government 
in 2005/2006, the confidence of the Sinhalese community in the 
government’s commitment to peace remained high despite the 
hard-line ethnonationalist stance of the Rajapakse government, 
while the confidence of the minority communities declined rapidly.
Another defining feature of the process was the 
internationalisation of peace in Sri Lanka. The US-led international 
community was actively involved in the attempt to craft liberal peace 
through roles as facilitators of peace negotiations (particularly 
Norway), monitors of the ceasefire agreement (the Nordic countries), 
and donors of aid for rehabilitation and reconstruction (especially 
the co-chairs to Sri Lanka’s donor conferences: Japan; European 
Union; Norway; US). While the internationalisation of peace in 
Sri Lanka was placed within the context of international security 
concerns, the international involvement in the peace process 
revolved primarily around domestic peace-development links rather 
than the global security-development nexus (Orjuela, 2011; Stokke, 
2011). As the peace process broke down and gave way to a war 
for peace, the emphasis on liberal peace among the international 
actors was gradually replaced by concerns about state sovereignty, 
security, and defeating terrorism. Norway played an especially 
prominent role as facilitator of the negotiations, co-organiser of the 
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Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM). and co-chair and donor at 
Sri Lanka’s donor conferences. The obstacles that were encountered 
in each role and the problems of combining three roles rendered 
Norway’s engagement in Sri Lanka controversial, especially when 
the negotiations stalled and the peace process became increasingly 
politicised and contested (Höglund and Svensson, 2011; Stokke, 
2011). 
Figure 11. Opinions on the role of international actors 
according to ethnicity.
 
Figure 11 shows the public support for the international 
actors in general and the specific role of Norway. The figure shows 
that public opinion toward the international actors was divided 
according to ethnicity, with Sinhalese respondents expressing 
less support than the Tamil and Muslim communities. All three 
communities, however, displayed relatively stable support for the 
international community throughout the ceasefire period. When it 
comes to Norway’s role, two main observations can be made. First, 
there was much higher support for Norway’ role in the Tamil (86.8 
per cent) and Muslim (60.3 per cent) minorities than in the Sinhalese 
(31.2 per cent) majority throughout the peace process. Even during 
the active-peace period, when some positive outcomes of the liberal 
peace project materialised, only one third of the Sinhala community 
supported Norwegian facilitation. Second, there was a steep decline 
in the support for Norway’s involvement among all communities 
when the process entered the negative-peace phase. The support 
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for Norway disappeared almost completely in the Sinhalese (5.2 
per cent) community once the negotiation process stalled and the 
violence between the two protagonists began to rise. It is noteworthy 
that even the very high degree of support that minority communities 
extended during the active-peace period drastically dropped among 
Tamils (37.7 per cent) and Muslims (24.6 per cent) when the active-
peace period was replaced by negative peace.  
Figure 11 highlights a puzzling question about why there 
was widespread and relatively stable support for international 
involvement despite the support for Norway’s role being divided 
between communities and weakened over time. Additional 
PCI data showed that the Sinhalese majority preferred Indian 
assistance in the peace process (Peiris and Stokke, 2011). Tamils, 
in contrast, expressed strong support for Norway, although they 
supported Indian assistance as well. This indicates that Figure 11 
reflects communalised perceptions and politicisation of different 
international actors. India, on the one hand, was long viewed as a 
protector of Tamils in Sri Lanka, but had also come down hard on 
LTTE and proscribed it as a terrorist organisation. Norway, on the 
other hand, was seen as being supportive of minority grievances. 
The Norwegians’ insistence on impartiality and parity of status 
between LTTE and GOSL was seen as tilting the balance in favour 
of the LTTE. Thus, there was relatively high and stable support 
for internationalisation of peace, but ethnically divided opinions on 
Norway as a third party to the negotiation process. 
Social differentiation and public opinion on peace
Having observed a clear ethnicisation of the public opinion 
on peace, the question is whether opinion is also divided according 
to class stratification. In order to answer this question, we have 
used the demographic information in the PCI survey to examine 
opinions within the Sinhalese majority according to occupation and 
education. For the analysis of occupation, the respondents were 
aggregated into three broad categories: (1) high-level jobs; (2) low-
level jobs; (3) unemployed. Those who worked as professionals and 
in middle-level jobs were slotted into the first category. This meant 
that executives, managers, big and small businessmen, teachers, 
officers, clerks, and all the middle-level formal employments were 
considered as high-level jobs. Those who engaged in labour-
intensive work in the formal or informal sectors were categorised as 
low-level jobs. The use of ‘high’ and ‘low’ does not imply a normative 
judgement on the occupations, but is simply a descriptive tool to 
group positions in social space. The third category, ‘unemployed’ 
comprised of diversified groups such as those who were unemployed 
at the time, those waiting to be employed, those who were still 
students, and housewives who, although technically employed, 
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usually identified themselves as unemployed. Similarly, a more 
diverse range of educational levels were divided into two broad 
categories of ‘up to ordinary level’, or basic education, and ‘ordinary 
level and above’, or higher education.
 
Figure 12. Sinhalese opinions on mode of conflict resolution 
according to occupation.
Figures 12, 13, and 14 show public opinion on peace 
within the Sinhalese majority according to occupation. Figure 
12 shows a slightly stronger preference for negotiations than a 
military solution to the conflict among those that are unemployed 
(in both periods) and among those in low-level jobs in the war-
for-peace period. Conversely, there is a stronger preference for a 
combination of military and political means of conflict resolution 
among people in high-level jobs in the war-for-peace period. Despite 
these differences, the most striking finding is that the preferences 
regarding mode of conflict resolution show relatively little variation 
across occupational categories. 
Figures 13 and 14 show the Sinhalese opinion on GOSL and 
LTTE commitment to negotiations and on the role of international 
actors, both analysed according to occupation categories. Regarding 
the GOSL and LTTE’s commitment to peace, the most notable 
pattern is that the public opinion shows very little variation between 
different occupation categories (Figure 13). The same observation 
holds true for the opinions on the role of international actors, 
in which the foremost observation is that there is little variation 
between the different occupations (Figure 14). However, it can be 
noted that those in high-level jobs and those who are unemployed 
express greater support for the international actors, and that there 
is a marked decline in the support among high-level jobs during the 
war-for-peace period. 
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Figure 13. Sinhalese opinions on GOSL and LTTE commitment to 
negotiated peace according to occupation.
Figure 14. Sinhalese opinions on the role of international actors 
according to occupation.
Figures 15, 16, and 17 show the same kind of analysis of 
Sinhalese opinions according to education level (up to or above 
ordinary level). The most striking finding is again that there are 
no obvious variations in the opinions among those with basic 
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education and those with higher education. Both groups show the 
same tendencies as the Sinhalese community as a whole, with very 
small and no systematic differences between them. It can also be 
mentioned that an additional analysis of public opinion in urban 
and rural areas yields no major difference across the urban-rural 
divide.
Figure 15. Sinhalese opinions on mode of conflict resolution 
according to education level.
The occupation- and education-based analyses show that 
public opinion on peace within the Sinhalese majority is not 
stratified according to class variables. This is in sharp contrast to 
the earlier analysis based on ethnicity. The classlessness in the 
public opinion on the peace process within the Sinhala community 
does not, however, mean that class is politically insignificant in 
general or for the questions of peace. Our argument is rather that 
the ethnicisation and classlessness of public opinion is a product 
of how people from various class strata have been incorporated 
into mass politics through ethnonationalist projects, yielding 
ethnic dispositions for knowing and acting that resonate with the 
way the conflict and its resolution is construed as an ethnic issue 
in political and media discourse. This shifts the focus from ethnic 
identities and class cleavages to political and media discourse on 
the peace process. 
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Figure 16. Sinhalese opinions on GOSL and LTTE commitment to 
negotiated peace according to education level.
Figure 17. Sinhalese opinions on the role of international actors 
according to education level.
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Cleavages, politicisation and public opinion
The analysis points to the prominence of ethnic identities 
and the relative insignificance of social differentiation within the 
Sinhalese community in the formation of public opinion toward 
peace during the ceasefire period. Furthermore, changing popular 
views over time point to the close links between the dynamics of the 
peace process and the public opinion. These ethnicised patterns 
and trends in public opinion can be read in different ways. One 
interpretation could be that the communal variations in public 
opinion reflected ethnic cleavages in society, in the sense that fixed 
ethnic identities constituted a basis for ethnicised assessments of 
the design, dynamics, and actors in the peace process. Another 
interpretation could be that the observed trends stemmed 
from manipulation by political elites, communicated to people 
through political and media discourse on the peace process. This 
interpretation gives primacy to the political elite while reducing 
the public to manipulable subjects and rendering it submissive to 
ethnicised strategies of governmentality. 
There is no doubt that political and media discourse played a 
key role in shaping the public opinion on peace in Sri Lanka during 
the ceasefire period. Nadarajah (2005) shows that the coverage 
of the peace process in the vernacular press became increasingly 
polarised along communal divides, reinforcing essentialist notions 
of ethnicity and providing ethnicised interpretations of key issues 
and actors in the peace process. For example, the Sinhala press 
was welcoming international participation in the form of Indian 
intervention, while being highly critical and suspicious of Norway’s 
role. Tamil media, in contrast, was invariably supportive of the 
peace process and Norwegian facilitation. Such media framing 
of the peace process resonates with the communal opinions on 
the international actors that we have identified above. Similar 
links between media discourse and public opinion can also be 
made for other key issues such as the questions of power-sharing 
arrangements, the commitment of GOSL and LTTE to negotiated 
peace, and interim administration in the north and east. Nadarajah 
(2005) also highlights that the Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim vernacular 
press were generally positive in the early stage of the peace process, 
while gradually increasing the critical attention to the process, thus 
providing a discursive context for the changing public opinion on 
peace.
Such observations lead to the conclusion that the observed 
ethnic divides and changes in public opinion reflected the way 
the peace process was politicised during the different stages of 
the ceasefire period. We do not, however, see this as a simple 
matter of manipulation by calculating political elites, but rather 
as an articulation between political and media discourses and the 
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dispositions for knowing and acting in the habitus of people. In the 
context of post-colonial political dynamics, it became commonsense 
for elite and popular actors to comprehend the conflict and the 
peace process in an ethnicised manner, and this was expressed and 
reinforced by political and media discourses. Such discourses are 
themselves closely related to the competitive struggle for legitimate 
authority in the political field. Thus, the communal divides and 
changes in public opinions during the ceasefire period were, in our 
view, reflective of both the general post-colonial construction of 
ethnic habitus, the politicisation of ethnic identities that emanated 
from the dynamics of the political field, and the politicisation of 
peace in political and media discourses during the different stages 
of the peace process.
Endnotes 
1 The active peace period was marked by a contentious co-habitation between the 
government led by Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe from the UNP and the 
directly elected President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga from the SLFP.
2 www.cpalanka.org
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